By Matthew Robshaw, Jonathan Katz

The 3 volume-set, LNCS 9814, LNCS 9815, and LNCS 9816, constitutes the refereed court cases of the thirty sixth Annual foreign Cryptology convention, CRYPTO 2016, held in Santa Barbara, CA, united states, in August 2016.

The 70 revised complete papers provided have been conscientiously reviewed and chosen from 274 submissions. The papers are equipped within the following topical sections: provable safety for symmetric cryptography; uneven cryptography and cryptanalysis; cryptography in concept and perform; compromised structures; symmetric cryptanalysis; algorithmic quantity conception; symmetric primitives; uneven cryptography; symmetric cryptography; cryptanalytic instruments; hardware-oriented cryptography; safe computation and protocols; obfuscation; quantum innovations; spooky encryption; IBE, ABE, and sensible encryption; computerized instruments and synthesis; 0 wisdom; theory.

**Read or Download Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2016: 36th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 14-18, 2016, Proceedings, Part I PDF**

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**Extra info for Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2016: 36th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 14-18, 2016, Proceedings, Part I**

**Example text**

Let t be a positive integer. Let E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a blockcipher and let XC[E, t] and Sample be as above. Then in the ideal-cipher model, for any adversary A that makes at most q Enc/Dec queries, and at most p Prim/PrimInv queries, Adv±prp XC[E,t],Sample (A) ≤ 4t qpt . 2t(k+n) (20) The proof is in Appendix C of the full version of this paper. Here we point out a few remarks. First oﬀ, we note the bound above (and its proof) can easily adapted to analyze XCX[E, t]. Moreover, the proof itself is a direct application of point-wise proximity combined with the transcript reduction technique to Key-Alternating Ciphers and Key-Length Extension L L L L L EJ EJ 27 EJ EJ Δ Fig.

5 for an illustration of XC[E, 2]. We also deﬁne – in analogy with KACX above – a version of XC with t subkeys L1 , . . , Lt (rather than t + 1), which xor’s Li to the input and the output of EJi in the i-th round. We refer to this as XCX[E, t], and note that it is simply the t-fold sequential composition of DESX [18]. Single-user security of XC[E, t]. The following theorem establishes the single-user security for XC[E, t] in the ideal-cipher model, and, in contrast to previous analyses [14,15,20], the resulting bound is essentially exact.

7. 2 0 6 rounds 0 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 Fig. 6. Su PRP security (distinct subkeys) of XC on 2 iterations (left) and 6 iterations (right) on k = 56 and n = 64: our bound versus the results in [14, 15]. The solid lines depict the bound in Theorem 3, and the dashed ones depict the bound obtained by combining the reduction in [14, 15] and our result in Theorem 1. In both pictures, q = 2n , and the x-axis gives the log (base 2) of p, and the y-axis gives upper bounds on the su PRP security of XC.